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Two Steps Back: British Lessons for
American Fair Lending Reform
By STEVEN KALAR*
I. Introduction
"Fair lending" legislation,1 which prohibits discrimination in the
making of loans, is currently one of the most controversial and parti-
san civil rights issues in the United States. It is also an area which the
Republican Congress has promised to reform. To fully appreciate the
consequences of this proposed reform, the British experience with an-
tidiscrimination lending law provides a useful comparative model.
In describing federal enforcement of fair lending law, David Car-
son, the Chairman of the Savings and Community Bankers of
America, compared the Department of Justice to a "ten-ton gorilla"
that "owns the jungle."2 While characterizing the lending industry's
reaction to fair lending enforcement, Mr. Carson was equally colorful:
"I guess we need an elephant gun to get the gorilla." 3
* Member of the Class of 1996. In 1995, the author was a summer clerk in the De-
partment of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section (HCE).
The views expressed in this Note are those of the author, and are not necessarily shared by
the Department of Justice.
The author would like to thank the attorneys of the Housing and Civil Enforcement
Section for their generous and insightful comments on this Note. In particular, I wvould
like to thank Sean Flynn for his research assistance, and Section Chief Paul Hancock, Nho
graciously agreed to an on-record interview.
Lisa's constant and unfailing support made this Note possible; its dedication to her is
but a small recognition of her role.
1. Because this Note is a general comparison of two political structures for promoting
nondiscriminatory lending, the term "fair lending legislation" is used very broadly. For
example, "[s]trictly speaking, the CRA (Community Reinvestment Act) is not a fair lend-
ing law. It calls for service to low-income communities, rather than minorities %ho suffer
discrimination. But it is one of a number of tools that have been used to help minorities."
Robert M. Garsson, Capitol Account Many Say Big Increase in Loans to Mtnorities Just
Proves the Point, Am. Banker (BNA), July 21, 1995, at 4. When this Note refers to the
Community Reinvestment Act or the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act as -fair lending leg-
islation," it does so in the sense that they are tools which promote fair lending.
2. Kim I. Eisler, Say Uncle: When the Feds Accuse You of Discrimination, It Can Be a
Lose-Lose Situation. Chevy Chase Bank Decided Not to Fight, NVAsHmGO4OALN, July
1995, at 47, 48.
3. Id.
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The 104th Congress has forged the "elephant gun" sought by Mr.
Carson in several measures which would dramatically limit fair lend-
ing laws. Three of the most far-reaching of these Republican propos-
als would curb the enforcement authority of the Department of
Justice, severely dilute the power of the Community Reinvestment
Act, and excuse many lenders from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
requirements.
Democratic Representative Gonzalez described one of these
measures as the "bank lobby grab bag bill,"'4 and alleged:
The bill makes it a whole lot easier for banks to engage in discrimi-
natory practices. Can you feature that? After all of this ado over
these years about antidiscrimination fights and please, thanks to one
especially zany amendment, the Justice Department is barred from
investigating fair lending cases.5
The current fair lending debate has focused on four Congres-
sional acts. The oldest of these, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA),
prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.6 The Act also
recognizes that a home-seeker must have equal access to all stages of
the housing process, and prohibits discrimination in the provisions of
"loans or other financial assistance." 7 Fair lending legislation in the
United States has evolved considerably since the Fair Housing Act,
and now includes the Community Reinvestment Act,8 the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act,9 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.10
Each of these laws has been slated for substantial reform.
Democrats have emphasized the severity of the problems ad-
dressed by fair lending legislation:
[Discriminatory lending] is an issue of critical importance to the
civil rights community and for America. Because with redlining
comes segregated housing patterns. With segregated housing comes
inferior schools, which leads to inferior jobs and leads us back to the
prediction of the Kerner Commission Report on civil disorders 20
4. 1445 CONG. REc. H6080 (daily ed. June 16, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
5. I
6. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act), Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title
VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988 &
Supp. VI 1994).
7. Id. § 3605.
8. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
9. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
10. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
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years ago, of two societies, one white and one black, separate and
unequal. 1
The lending industry has countered that loan reporting require-
ments are burdensome and expensive, and are applied unequally
among different lending institutions.12 Federal bank and thrift regula-
tors have criticized the lack of clear guidelines in enforcing fair lend-
ing policy.'3
Longstanding criticisms of fair lending lav have finally coalesced
into a direct political attack. Republicans have characterized the
Community Reinvestment Act as one of the ten most burden-produc-
ing laws for industry.14 After gaining control of Congress in the No-
vember 1994 elections, Republicans promptly targeted fair lending
laws for reform.' 5 In the first months of the 104th Congress, some
Republicans even discussed outright repeal of the Community Rein-
vestment Act.'
6
The repeal or substantial reform of American fair lending legisla-
tion will have tremendous repercussions for the lending industry, for
minority home-seekers, and for inner-city neighborhoods. The inef-
fective British experience with fair lending cautions against this
reform.
In the 1960s, the United States led the development of antidis-
crimination legislation, and its progress influenced the development of
English law.'7 However, while the phenomenon of racial discrimina-
11. 135 CONG. REc. H2578 (daily ed. June 14, 1989) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
12. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act An
Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. RE%. 291, 293 (1993).
13. Financial Institutions: OTS Chief Not Pleased wid Fair Lending Policy, Requests
Meeting With Justice, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A200 (Oct. 19, 1994).
14. Congress, D'Amato Announces Senate Banking Leaders with Sens. Shelby and
Gramm in Key Slots, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at F27 (Feb. 9, 1995).
15. Republican Senator Richard Shelby now chairs the new Financial Institutions and
Regulatory Relief Subcommittee. Id. Senator Shelby has promised a "major piece of le.g-
islation dealing with deregulation." Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Sen. Shelby to Seek Easing
of Regulatory Burden, Am. Banker (BNA), at 2 (Feb. 8, 1995).
16. Republican Campaign May Kill CRA, AM. BArKER WASH, WATCH, Feb. 6, 1995,
at 1.
17. See Shari Engels, Problems of Proof in Employment Discrimination: The Need for
a Clearer Definition of Standards in the United States and die United Kingdom, 15 Ca!.1p.
LAB. L. 340-41 (1994). The American Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the model for the
British Race Relations Act of 1965. Id. British advocates of the 1965 Race Relations Act
drew upon the experiences of the American Civil Rights movement. Christopher McCrud-
den, Racial Discrimination, in IN, uAL RIGHrS AND THE Lxw N BRiTAIN 412 (Christo-
pher McCrudden & Gerald Chambers eds., 1994). Three years later, the 1963 Race
Relations Act was influenced by American enforcement measures in antidiscrimination
law. Id. at 413.
19951
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tion is similar in both countries, British antidiscrimination laws and
their enforcement have traditionally been less vigorous than those in
America."8 As the United States considers scaling back its fair lend-
ing laws, the United Kingdom well illustrates the effectiveness (or in-
effectiveness) of limited central government protection of minorities
in the lending market.19
This Note will examine the extent of discrimination in home lend-
ing in the United States, and will briefly evaluate some of the legisla-
tion that has been adopted to address this problem. It will then
review similar lending discrimination studies in the United Kingdom,
and assess the shortcomings of British law in dealing with the prob-
lem. Finally, the Note will explore the repercussions of reform or re-
peal of American fair lending law, using the British experience as a
predictive model.
If. Fair Lending in the United States
Out of concern for this lending shortage arose a series of federal
legislative efforts, beginning with the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and
continuing until the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.20 The
body of legislation resulting from this period attempts to address the
problem of fair lending, including the overall responsibilities of banks
18. Ole Hansen, Litigation, A Strategy for Fighting Racial Discrimination?, LAG
BULL., Oct. 1981, at 229.
19. Obvious differences between the United Kingdom and the United States limit the
value of a comparative analysis of antidiscrimination legislation. Among the most impor-
tant differences are the absence of an entrenched bill of rights in the United Kingdom and
the absence of a power of judicial review of primary legislation. D.G.T. Williams, Aspects
of Equal Protection in the United Kingdom, 59 TUL. L. REv. 959, 959-60 (1985). "[T]he
role of British courts in matters of discrimination is severely limited, and little can be
drawn from the common law to enable judges to formulate and to develop a vigorous
concept of equal protection." Id. at 965. Another key difference is the contrast in size of
minority populations. In the United Kingdom, minorities constitute roughly 4% of the
total population while in the United States minorities comprise 21% of the total popula-
tion. John Goering, Research Note: Race and Public Housing in Britain and the United
States: Notes for a Policy Relevant Research Agenda, 18 NEw COMMUNrrY 3,457-58 (1992).
However, there are sufficient similarities between the two countries to make for fruitful
comparison. The United States and United Kingdom have had a parallel development of
civil rights law. See Macey & Miller, supra note 12. Both countries have "notable concen-
trations of people of colour living in poverty areas in the inner cities, often in housing with
minimal amenities or in a homeless state." Goering, supra at 458. Most importantly, the
"existence of active racial discrimination in housing markets has been documented in each
country using testers." Id.
20. George C. Galster, Use of Testers in Investigating Discrimination in Mortgage
Lending and Insurance, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF Dis-
CRIMINATON IN AMERICA 287 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993).
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to their communitites.21 This legislation cannot be fairly said to have
cured the problem; lending discrimination was deemed a factor con-
tributing to the 1992 Los Angeles riots." Furthermore, federal fair
lending legislation has come under criticism from federal regulators,
the lending industry, and fair housing advocates.2 Despite these criti-
cisms, fair lending legislation and litigation have had a profound im-
pact on the way the lending industry and the federal government deal
with minority loan applicants.
A. Lending Discrimination in the United States
Discrimination in lending received national attention following
publication of the Pulitzer prize-winning story The Color of Money in
a May 1988 series of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution.4 This in-
vestigation revealed substantial discrepancies in loan approval rates
for white and black loan applicants. 5
After securing the data from a Freedom of Information Act re-
quest, the Journal-Constitution analyzed $6 billion in home loans
made over six years by eighty-eight metropolitan Atlanta banks and
savings and loans.26 The analysis showed that white applicants in met-
ropolitan Atlanta were five times more likely to get home loans than
black applicants living in metropolitan Atlanta with the same income
level.27 The article found that some lenders accepted mortgage appli-
cations from white areas only, loan officers visited real estate agents
only in white neighborhoods, and as neighborhood composition
21. Id
22. Fair Lending Enforcement and the Data on the 1992 Home Afort.age Disclosure
Act [HMDA]: Hearing on the Problem of Racial Discrimination in LEndmng, How, Current
Enforcement of Fair Lending Practices Might be Strengthened and to Improre the Coordina-
tion Between the Justice Departmen HUD, Federal Financial Institutions and Requllton,
Agencies Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993) (statement of Attorney General Janet Reno) (-Lendin, discrimi-
nation is particularly harmful to our inner cities. The riots last year in Los Anggc~s follow-
ing the State court verdict in the Rodney King case, called attention to the devastating
effect of diminished economic opportunity in minority neighborhoods.").
23. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 13. See also Jennifer Thelan, New Rules for
Reinvestment War, RECORDER, Dec. 23, 1993, at I ("Activists and lenders complain that
the system rewards banks for amassing thick files and producing spiffy brochures instead of
making loans.").
24. Bill Dedman, The Color of Money, ATArrA CoNsr., May 1. 19S3. at A01.
25. Id.
26. Tom Bennett, Green Eyeshade Award Goes to 'Color of Money' Bank Series:
'Money' Series Wins as Top Story in South, ATrrA Co,%br., Mar. 19, 1939, at D01.
27. Id.
1995]
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changed from white to black, bank branches shortened their hours or
withdrew from the neighborhood.28
The Color of Money prompted nationwide media interest in fair
lending.29 In Texas, studies revealed that two thrifts paid considerably
more to its directors in fees than they provided to minority neighbor-
hoods in the form of loans.3 0 In Detroit, the number of loans made by
banks and thrifts in "stable, middle-income white areas" was three
times higher than in comparable black areas.3 ' In California, studies
showed that seven of the state's largest banks made only 438 home
mortgage loans to the state's 2.5 million African-Americans. 2
While informative, these local studies soon came under "wither-
ing" attack by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board.33 A more meth-
odologically rigorous study was conducted by the Boston Federal
28. Id.
29. Jim King, Mortgages in Black and White: New Data Offers Broadest Look Yet,
ATLANTA CONST., March 15, 1992, at G3. The series also prompted the Department of
Justice to begin an investigation of 64 metropolitan Atlanta banks. Id. This investigation
eventually resulted in the Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Association consent decree,
the first race discrimination lawsuit against a major home mortgage lender. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SETLES FIRST RACE DIsCRIMINATION LAWSUIT
AGAINST MAJOR HOME MORTGAGE LENDER 1 (1992). The Color of Money also sparked
Congressional interest, and eventually contributed to the passage of laws requiring far
more extensive disclosure of loan applicant data by financial institutions. King, supra,
30. Ken Martin, Study Criticizes Reconstituted Institutions' Lending Patterns, AUSTIN
BUS. J., July 1, 1990, at 1. Analysis of the Texas thrifts was done by the Southern Finance
Project (SFP) the primary consultant for the Color of Money series. Id. The group re-
ported, "For every thousand dollars of federal assistance the six [lending] firms received in
their 1988 [federal bailout] deals, they invested a combined 11 cents in all minority neigh-
borhoods in Dallas, Houston, San Antonio and Austin in 1989." Id.
31. Galster, supra note 20, at 292.
32. Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage Lending Discrimination,
Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 554 (1993) (statement of John
Gamboa, Executive Director of Latino Issues Forum and Co-Chair of the Greenlining
Coalition).
33. Galster, supra note 20, at 292. Critics attacked the methodology of the Detroit and
Atlanta tests, noting that demand was not controlled, and the rate of sales in middle-in-
come white Atlanta neighborhoods was double that of middle-income black communities.
Id. Critics also contend results were skewed since banks (required to report data) compete
against mortgage bankers (who are not required to report) in many neighborhoods. Id.
Finally, the income of the tracts was not controlled effectively. Id. When these criticisms
were taken into account, 1992 studies in Atlanta found that when "loans from all sources
are considered, residents of middle-class black neighborhoods are 10 percent more likely
to apply for loans, but 25 percent less likely to get them than residents of comparable white
neighborhoods." King, supra note 29.
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Reserve Bank in 1992.14 The most comprehensive study of its kind at
the time, it reviewed over 3000 loan applications in the Boston area
and concluded that lenders rejected minority applicants fifty-six per-
cent more often than they rejected otherwise identical white appli-
cants.35 Though also subject to methodological attackZ subsequent
analysis of the Boston Federal study confirmed its findings and re-
vealed "an even stronger statistical case for discrimination than was
originally reported.
37
Regression studies have also confirmed a correlation between
race and home loans.s These studies have shown that "[t]he number
of conventional loans in a tract proves to be negatively correlated (in
a statistically significant fashion) with the percentage of black resi-
dents and (in Chicago) of Hispanic residents."' 3
In a recent six-month study, U.S. News and World Report found
that:
[Middle income black applicants from mostly minority areas were
more than twice as likely to be rejected for mortgage loans as mid-
dle-income whites living in mostly white areas. For blacks, the re-
jection rate was 37%; for whites, it was just l8%. Overall, residents
of middle-income white neighborhoods received 61% more mort-
gage loans than residents of middle-income minority areas did.1
Testing of loan officers has confirmed trends suggested by statisti-
cal studies. In the typical fair lending test (or "audit"), white and mi-
nority testers are paired and given similar financial profiles and loan
needs, and are sent out to "purchase" homes in similar neighbor-
hoods4 1 Testers visit loan agents individually and report their exper-
iences to the test coordinator.42 One such test in Louisville, Kentucky
34. Alicia Munnell et al., Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Mortgage Lending 02 Boston:
Interpreting the HMDA Data, in Senate Committee on Banking, supra note 32, at 533
(1992).
35. JAMEs H. CARR & IsAc F. MEGBOLUGBE, FANmNE OnlcE OF HouzsrG RE.
sEARCH, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON STUDY ON MORTGAGE LE'%DrNG RE-
visrrED (1993).
36. Critics of the study included Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker. Id. Method-
ological errors alleged included data errors in the HMDA data. Id. at vi.
37. Id. at 35.
38. Galster, supra note 20, at 293.
39. Id.
40. Penny Loeb et al., The New Redlining: It's Differcnt From the OM but Mtnorltf s
Are Still Getting Shortchanged, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 17, 1995, at 51, 52.
41. Galster, supra note 20, at 307-08.
42. Id. at 309.
1995]
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sent investigators to ten lending institutions.a3 Black testers were told
the lender did not interview for mortgages at the bank, were steered
to other institutions, and were not given time estimates for completion
of the loan.' White testers were given information, encouraged to
apply for a conventional loan, and told they were likely to qualify in a
matter of minutes. Black testers received useful information about
how they might qualify for a loan in fifteen percent of their visits;
white testers received such information during twenty-seven percent
of their visits. 46 A similar study in Chicago found differential treat-
ment in seven of the ten lending institutions tested.47
One of the most comprehensive audits conducted to date in-
volved roughly 3800 tests in the summer of 1989 in twenty-five metro-
politan areas.4 8  The study found that "blacks encountered
unfavorable treatment4 9 forty-six percent of the time when renting a
home and fifty percent of the time when trying to purchase one. For
Hispanics the respective rates of unfavorable treatment were almost
as high ... forty-three percent of the time in rentals and forty-five
percent in sales."50
Whether through statistical analysis of loan application data, or
testing studies using paired investigators, discrimination in the provi-
sion of home loans is becoming an increasingly well-documented phe-
nomenon in the United States.5 ' As awareness of this problem has
43. Id. at 307.
44. Id at 309.
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Id. at 312. The Chicago study used eight female testers, four black and four white,
between the ages of 28 and 41. Id. All were given profiles that made them marginally
qualified for the loan. Id. at 311. The most common difference reported between the test-
ers was that black testers had a difficult time getting the loan officer to take enough time to
provide information or prequalify them. Id. at 312.
48. Michael Fix et al., An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination, in FLx & STRUYK
supra note 20, at 1, 18. The audit is known as the "Housing Discrimination Study." Id.
49. "Unfavorable treatment" includes the "combined incidence of opportunity-deny-
ing and opportunity-diminishing treatment for housing." Id. at 22. Thus, the term includes
everything from "door slamming" to providing less favorable terms or less information to
the tester. Id. at 20-22.
50. Id at 22.
51. Critics have contested the viability of statistical studies. See Jaret Seiberg, Tech.
niques in Loan Bias Studies Challenged, Am. Banker (BNA), Jan. 17, 1995, at 2 ("Mr.
Yezer, an economist at George Washington University, maintains that the analytical tech-
niques used in these studies are fatally flawed."). However, proponents of the studies
question the viability of these criticisms. For example, William Milczarski, a professor of
Urban Affairs at New York's Hunter College likened the critic's analysis to "people who
still claim that studies showing a link between smoking and cancer are flawed." Id. Even
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increased, Congress has created new data collection mechanisms and
explored new methods of enforcing fair lending law.
B. Fair Lending Law in the United States
Today's loan agent faces a broad array of laws and regulations
addressing lending discrimination and a bank's role in the community,
ranging from the Civil Rights Act of 1866- 2 to the new Community
Reinvestment Act regulations adopted in May of 1995.53 This Note
will focus on three measures targeted for reform: (1) authorization of
the Department of Justice to pursue fair lending investigations under
the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA), (2) Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) application pro-
cedures, and (3) loan reporting requirements under the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
1. The FHA, ECOA, and the Department of Justice
The progenitor of American fair lending legislation is the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (FHA), as amended by the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988.-1 The Act prohibits discrimination on the
grounds of "race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or na-
tional origin" in "residential real estate-related transactions."' ' These
transactions include the "making or purchasing of loans or providing
other financial assistance.., for purchasing, constructing, improving,
repairing or maintaining a dwelling." 
- 6
Credit discrimination is also prohibited by the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act (ECOA) of 1974.1 The Act prohibits discrimination in
all forms of credit, including consumer, business, and home mortgage
loans.' s Like the Fair Housing Act, the ECOA prohibits discrimina-
critics concede that one way to "truly detect bias ... is through bank examinations or
programs that send decoy loan applicants into lending offices." Id.
52. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 1. 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (198S & Supp. VI 1994).
53. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22.,156 (1935) (to b2
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25, 12 C.F.R. pt. 228 12 C.F.R. pt. 345. 12 C.F.R. pt. 5563 . 12
C.F.R. Pt. 203) [hereinafter "CRA Regulations'].
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (198S & Supp. VI 1994).
55. 1& § 3605(a).
56. Id § 3605(b)(1)(A).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
58. Id. § 1691(a) (19S8 & Supp. VI 1994). The Act defines "credit" to mean -the right
granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its
payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment therefor." Id.
1995]
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tion based on race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.5 9 To the
Fair Housing Act's protected categories the ECOA adds age, marital
status, and the receipt of public assistance.60 A creditor must inform
an applicant of its action on an application within thirty days, and if an
adverse action is taken the creditor must provide an explanation to
the applicant in writing.61
While individuals may pursue private causes of action under both
the FHA62 and ECOA,63 it is the enforcement of these Acts by the
Department of Justice which has proven particularly controversial.
The Fair Housing Act's "pattern and practice" language gives the
Attorney General broad enforcement authority. The Act provides
that:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or prac-
tice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted
by this title, or that any group of persons has been denied any of the
rights granted by this title and such denial raises an issue of general
public importance, the Attorney General may commence a civil ac-
tion in any appropriate United States district court.
64
As will be discussed more fully, infra, one of the most radical fair
lending amendments proposed in the 104th Congress would entirely
delete this clause from the Fair Housing Act, severely limiting the At-
torney General's ability to pursue Fair Housing Claims.65
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994); 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1988 & Supp.
VI 1994).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
61. Id § 1691(d)(2).
62. Parties injured under the Fair Housing Act may submit complaints to the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which investigates allegations and at-
tempts to conciliate the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a),(b) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994). Upon
a finding of reasonable cause, the Secretary of HUD must issue a charge on behalf of the
complainant. Id. § 3610(g)(2)(A). The complainant can then allow an administrative law
judge to hear the case, id. § 3612(b), or can "elect" to have a civil action maintained on his
or her behalf by the Attorney General, id. § 3612(o). The Fair Housing Act may also be
enforced by individuals or entities injured by acts of unlawful discrimination by a private
suit in federal court. Id. § 3613.
63. Injured parties may bring a private cause of action under the ECOA in federal
court, and are entitled to attorney's fees in addition to damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a)-(d)
(1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1988 & Supp. VI 1994) (emphasis added).
65. Amendment to H.R. 1362, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1995)
(Rep. McCollum) [hereinafter "McCollum Amendment"].
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In addition to the relief available under the Fair Housing Act of
1968,66 the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988 also allow the Attorney
General to seek monetary damages for the aggrieved person, 7 or to
seek a civil penalty against the respondent.6S
"Pattern and practice" language similar to that found in the Fair
Housing Act is also found in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.69
Like the Fair Housing Act, the Attorney General's authority to pur-
sue these pattern and practice cases has also been threatened by Con-
gressional amendment.7"
Unlike the Fair Housing Act, which only provides for referrals to
the Attorney General from HUD, 71 the ECOA requires a wide range
of agencies to refer cases for enforcement. In 1991 amendments to
the ECOA, Congress directed federal banking regulatory agencies-
including the Federal Reserve Board (the Board), the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)-
to refer creditors suspected of a pattern and practice of discrimination
to the Department of Justice for prosecution. However, differences
remain between the agencies and the Department of Justice regarding
which cases merit referral? 3
66. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1994).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B) (1985 & Supp. VI 1994).
68. Id. § 3614(d)(1)(C).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (19S5 & Supp. VI 1994) (-whenever he has reason to
believe that one or more creditors are engaged in a pattern or practice in violation of this
subchapter, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in any appropriate United States
district court for such relief as may be appropriate, including actual and punitive damagas
and injunctive relief"). Note that the ECOA allows the Attorney General to seek relief
similar to that found in the Fair Housing Act, although there is no provision for civil penal-
ties. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (19SS & Supp. VI 1994).
70. McCollum Amendment, supra note 65.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g) (1985 & Supp. VI 1994).
72. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 105 Stat. 223-6. § 223
(1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (Supp. VI 1994)). Other agencies obligated to
report violations include: the National Credit Union Administration, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Agieulture, the Farm
Credit Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Small Bus iness
Administration. However, the fair lending debate typically focuses upon the Board, the
OTS, the FDIC. and the OCC.
73. See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interim Procedursfor Exam-
ining for Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in Residential Lending, in JOHN C. Mu p.HY ET
AL., FAIR LENDING COMPLIANCE THE NEW STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOPr FINeiA.L.
INsTTUoNS 146, 174 (1994) ("Notifying these enforcement agencies is required under
0CC policy implementing ECOA and appropriate even in many situations in whdwh there ts
no 'pattern or practice' of apparent violations and even if the bank adnits to errors or vtola-
tions.") (emphasis in original).
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The Attorney General, acting through the Department of Justice,
has brought eight fair lending cases to date.74 Of these, four have
been referred by regulatory agencies.75 The four remaining "pattern
and practice" cases include both the first fair lending case brought by
the Justice Department, 76 and the Department's most controversial
fair lending action.77
The first federal fair lending case well illustrates the role of "pat-
tern and practice" authority in the enforcement of fair lending law. In
United States v. Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Association, the
United States alleged that Decatur Federal "rejected qualified black
applicants more often than qualified white applicants, even after con-
trolling for all relevant underwriting variables, such as income, credit
history, net worth, debt ratios, employment history, and education
level. ' 78 In its complaint, the Government noted that in five years
Decatur had processed over 24,000 loan applications in the Atlanta
area, only six percent of which were from black applicants.79
74. Each of the first six fair lending cases investigated by the Department of Justice
has resulted in consent decrees. See United States v. Decatur Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n,
No. 1 92-CV-2198-CAM (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992); United States v. Shawmut Mortgage
Co., No. CIV. 3.93 CV-2453 (D. Conn. Dec. 13, 1993); United States v. Blackpipe State
Bank, No. 93-5115 (D.S.D. Jan. 21, 1994); United States v. The First Nat'l Bank of Vicks-
burg, No. CIV. 5:94 CV 6(b)(n) 1990 (W.D. Miss., Jan. 21, 1994); United States v. Chevy
Chase Fed. Sav. Bank and B.F. Saul Mortgage Co., No. 94-1824-JG (D.D.C. Aug. 22,
1994); United States v. The Northern Trust Co., No. 95 C 3239 (N.D. I11. June 1, 1995).
The Department of Justice reached settlements with two more lenders in the fall of
1995. See R. Christian Bruce, Justice Settles First Suit on Overages; Also Settles with Bank
on Illegal Rates, 65 Banking Rep. (BNA) at 667 (October 23, 1995) (describing suits against
the Huntington Mortgage Company of Columbus, Ohio, and the Security State Bank of
Pecos, Texas).
75. United States v. Shawmut Mortgage Co., No. CIV. 3.93 CV-2453 (D. Conn. Dec.
13, 1993) (referred by the Federal Trade Commission - Federal Reserve Board); United
States v. The First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg, No. CIV. 5:94 CV 6(b)(n) 1990 (S.D. Miss.,
Jan. 21, 1994) (referred by the OCC).
The fair lending settlements between Justice and the Huntington Mortgage Company
and the Security State Bank in the fall of 1995 were also regulatory agency referrals.
Bruce, supra note 74 (referred by the OCC and the Federal Reserve Board, respectively).
76. United States v. Decatur Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, No. 1 92-CV-2198-CAM (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 17, 1992).
77. United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank and B.F. Saul Mortgage Co., No. 94-
1824-JG (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994).
78. United States v. Decatur Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, No. 1 92-CV-2198-CAM at 3
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992) (consent decree).
79. Complaint of the United States at 6, United States v. Decatur Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n, No. 1 92-CV-2198-CAM (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992).
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The Decatur settlement included one million dollars paid to per-
sons injured by the bank's discriminatory policies,s° and extensive in-
junctive and compliance provisions.81 Decatur was required to
expand its lending territory into minority neighborhoods, advertise ex-
tensively in black-oriented media, create incentives for account execu-
tives to make loans in black neighborhoods, and open a new branch in
a black section of Atlanta.
Other "pattern and practice" cases have included prosecution of
a lending institution discriminating against Native Americans,,'3 and a
recent case where a Chicago bank helped white applicants explain and
document adverse items on their credit reports, but rarely offered the
same help to minority applicants,34 However, it was the pattern and
practice case brought against Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank
which "hit the mortgage industry like a thunderbolt.",5
United States v. Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank was the first
lending discrimination suit based solely on a lender's alleged refusal to
market its services in minority neighborhoods.8' The Department of
Justice alleged that the bank had violated the FHA and ECOA by
"declaring black areas off-limits for mortgage lending, a practice
otherwise known as redlining."'  The resulting consent decree in-
cluded the payment of $11 million through a special loan program in
areas where the bank had allegedly refused to loan.
The Chevy Chase case remains enormously controversial. As one
writer has characterized the dispute, "[i]n the banking business these
days, the cry is not Waco, but Chevy Chase.",-9 In its defense, Chevy
Chase Federal cited statistics which showed that the bank had -ap-
proved black loan applicants at an 88 percent rate, far higher than the
80. United States v. Decatur Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, No. 1 92-CV-219-CAM at 24
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992) (consent decree).
81. Id. at 4-23.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Blackpipe State Bank, No. 93-5115 (D.S.D. Jan. 21. 1994).
84. United States v. The Northern Trust Co., No. 95 C 3239 (N.D. I11, June 1, 1935).
85. Eisler, supra note 2, at 48.
86. DEvr. or Jus'Tcu, Justice Department Obtains Unprcccdented SttLpent from
D.C. Area Bank for Allegedly Failing to Service Predominantly Black Areas, AuZ. 22, 1 34,
at 1 (press release).
87. Id. at 1, 2.
88. United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank and B.F. Saul Mortgage Co,, No. 94-
1824-JG at 3 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994) (consent decree); see also Banking, Jttstice Czevey
Chase Savings Settle Marketing Claims under Civil Rights Act, Daily Rep. for Exccutive2S
(BNA), at A161 (Aug. 23, 1994).
89. Eisler, supra note 2, at 47.
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national average of 69 percent."'9 Furthermore, the Justice Depart-
ment was unable to allege "a single case of lending discrimination."9 1
Nonetheless, Attorney General Reno asserted that "to shun an entire
community because of its racial makeup is just as wrong as to reject an
applicant because they are African-American."9'
The Chevy Chase case can be largely credited with spurring con-
gressional efforts to strip the pattern and practice authority granted
the Attorney General under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Op-
portunity Acts. Critics claim the Justice Department overreached its
authority in Chevy Chase and improperly enforced another targeted
fair lending law, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).93 Re-
gardless of the accuracy of that viewpoint,94 the Chevy Chase case can-
not be held solely responsible for CRA reform. The Community
Reinvestment Act may eventually undergo a restructuring which will
far exceed the reform of any other fair lending legislation, by a Con-
gress motivated by hostility toward the very existence of the Act.
2. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
For much of the first session of the 104th Congress, the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act has been the eye of the banking reform mael-
strom.95 Ironically, though the Community Reinvestment Act is the
90. Id. at 50.
91. Id.
92. DEPT. OF JusMrcE, supra note 86, at 1.
93. In criticizing the Chevy Chase case, the lending industry alleged that "[t]he Justice
Department is determined to use fair lending laws to enforce the Community Reinvest-
ment Act." Jaret Seiberg, Fair-Lending Law Seen as Tool to Enforce CRA Rules, Am.
Banker (BNA), Sept. 9, 1994, at 3. Counsel for the Independent Bankers Association of
America commented, "Justice is not the enforcer of CRA. But it seems like Justice is using
this as a back door." Id.
94. The Department of Justice denies that it sought to enforce the CRA in the Chevy
Chase case. See Interview with Paul Hancock, Section Chief, Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, in Washington, D.C. at 11 (Aug. 28,
1995) [hereinafter Hancock Interview] (transcript available at the office of the Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review) ("INTERVIEWER: Does reliance on Com-
munity Reinvestment Act compliance in consent decrees and complaints suggest that Jus-
tice is in fact acting as a back-door enforcer of the CRA? HANCOCK: No, no we don't
enforce the CRA; we don't have authority to enforce the CRA. CRA compliance is rele-
vant to a fair lending investigation; it can be relevant, it is not always relevant.... It is a
starting point for analyzing a bank's performance. If the bank is not complying with CRA,
and not helping to meet the credit needs of the entire community, it could be in violation
of the CRA and it may not be in violation of fair lending laws; because those laws don't
address low and moderate income status-they address race and national origin, for
example.").
95. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
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focus of the fair lending debate, there is no mention of "race" within
the Act.96 The CRA is based on the principle "found in our banking
laws as far back as the 1930's, that financial institutions should serve
the 'convenience and needs of their communities.''1 7 The Act consid-
ers that "financial institutions have an obligation to help meet the
credit needs of their entire communities, including low- and moder-
ate-income neighborhoods."9
The Act requires the federal financial regulatory agencies-the
FDIC, National Credit Union Administration, OCC, and OTS-to
"assess the [lending] institution's record of meeting the credit needs of
its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods." 99 The agencies have developed regulationsIcL requiring lend-
ing institutions to delineate "assessment areas" within which an
agency evaluates an institution's "record of helping to meet the credit
needs of the community."101 Depending on the size of the institution,
it must also collect and report data on small business, small farm, and
home mortgage loans.l °2 Institutions are required to make public files
96. See Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1977) (19S3 & Supp. VI
1994).
97. FEDERAL FINANaAL IsTrrtmoNs EXAMINATION CAOuNciL, A CnzEN's GuIE
TO THE CRA 3 (1992) [hereinafter "EXAMINATION COUNCIL"]..
98. Id.
99. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(1) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
100. The federal regulatory agencies are authorized to promulgate "regulations to carry
out the purposes" of the CRA. 12 U.S.C. § 2905. On May 4, 1995, the Federal Register
carried the "joint final rule" on the CRA regulations to be enforced by the federal regula-
tory agencies. CRA Regulations, supra note 53, at 22,156. The history of these regulations
and their reform illustrates the controversy surrounding the CRA. Financial institutions
complained that the CRA, as originally enforced, was unclear, inconsistent, and required
excessive paperwork. Id. at 22,156, 22,157. Community and consumer groups agreed that
the CRA was inconsistent, and that CRA examinations overemphasized process and un-
deremphasized performance. Id. at 22,157. In response, in 1993 President Clinton asked
the regulatory agencies to reform the CRA regulatory system. Id. After seven national
public hearings, the agencies published proposed revisions to the CRA regulations on De-
cember 21, 1993. Id. The agencies collectively received 6700 comment letters on the revi-
sions, including many which "expressed concern over aspects ... that they viewed as
allocating credit to particular kinds of borrowers." Id. Consequently, the agencies wrote
another proposal, published on October 7, 1994. Id. To this second proposal the agencies
received 7200 comment letters. Id. at 22,158. The agencies relied upon these comments in
rewriting the 1994 proposal, and creating the 1995 "final rule." Id. The new regulations
will be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25, 12 C.F.Rt pt. 228, 12 C.F.R. pt. 245, 12 C.F.R. pt. 5632,
and 12 C.F.R. pt. 203. Descriptions of CRA evaluations and requirements in this Note are
based upon the 1995 "final rule."
101. See, e.g., CRA Regulations, supra note 53, at 22,184, § 25.41(a).
102. See, eg., CRA Regulations, supra note 53, at 22,184, § 25.42(a)-(b). The institu-
tion may also report other consumer loan data if it would like it included in its lending test
evaluation. See id. § 25.42(c).
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which include a wide variety of information on their community lend-
ing performance. 10 3
The federal regulatory agencies grade each institution, rating its
level of performance in meeting community credit needs as
"[o]utstanding," "[s]atisfactory," "[n]eeds to improve," or
"[s]ubstantial noncompliance."'1 Since the 1989 amendments to the
CRA, the regulatory agencies have been compelled to make their
"CRA Performance Evaluations" available to the public. 05 In a re-
cent change to the regulations, agencies have agreed to publish dates
of upcoming examinations, and to consider comments from the
public.'0 6
Lenders contend that the CRA imposes a significant regulatory
burden.1° 7 Furthermore, a poor CRA evaluation may significantly
tarnish the image of a lender in its community. However, the compli-
ance burden and public relations repercussions are not the industry's
primary criticisms. Of greater concern (and, advocates contend, of
greater value) are the regulatory ramifications of an unfavorable CRA
rating.
After reviewing a lending institution's record of meeting commu-
nity lending needs, the federal regulatory agency must "take such rec-
ord into account in its evaluation of an application for a deposit
facility by such institution.'10 8 Applications to the regulatory agencies
can cover the entire gamut of activity, from seeking a charter for a
national bank, to applying for federal deposit insurance or relocation
103. See, eg., CRA Regulations, supra note 53, at 22,185, § 25.43.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994). These ratings were based on 12
CRA "assessment factors," which include "evidence or prohibited discriminatory or other
illegal credit practices" and "any practice intended to discourage applications for types of
credit set forth in the institution's CRA Statement." EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note
97, at 6. Under the newly adopted regulations, the same range of ratings will be given. See,
e.g., CRA Regulations, supra note 53, at 22,183, § 25.289(a). However, the ratings will be
based upon "lending, investment, and service tests." See, e.g., CRA Regulations, supra
note 53 at 22,170 ("Component Test Ratings"); It. at 22,180, § 25.21(a). Discriminatory
lending "adversely affects the [agency's] evaluation of a bank's performance." See, e.g., Id.
at 22,183, § 25.28(c).
105. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 4.
106. Se4 eg., CRA Regulations, supra note 53, at 22,189 (App. B to pt. 25-CRA
Notice).
107. See Paul Nadler, Weekly Adviser: Compliance Seminar is Sign of the Times for
Small Banks, Am. Banker (BNA), Feb. 7, 1995, at 8. ("Compliance is one of the biggest
challenges facing this industry, which many think the government is trying to micromanage
... Many bankers complain that examiners focus less on lending policies than on compli-
ance bookkeeping.").
108. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(2) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
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of the home office.'0 9 An application is also required for merger or
consolidation with another financial institution. 10 Therefore, by re-
ceiving an unfavorable CRA rating, discriminatory lending practices
can block a lender's applications to federal regulatory agencies and
sour multi-million dollar mergers and acquisitions.
Recognizing the power of the CRA in the context of mergers and
acquisitions, fair lending advocates have opposed applications to regu-
latory agencies and demanded concessions from suspect lenders."'
First Interstate Bank of California promised to open an inner-city
mortgage office in San Diego, to lend $2 billion to low- and moderate-
income borrowers statewide over ten years, and to move a district of-
fice to Bakersfield; all concessions were made to appease opposition
to its acquisition of small community banks. 1 2 Similarly, when
BankAmerica Corp. applied to merge with Security Pacific Corp. in
1991 it announced it was increasing its ten year, low-income lending
pledge from $5 billion to $12 billion.' 13 Chase Manhattan Corp. and
Chemical Banking Corp., while seeking a merger, committed $18.1
billion over the next five years to community investment.1 4 While
these advocacy efforts are not always successful,115 one community
group claims that the CRA is responsible for more than $60 billion in
commitments for loans targeted to residents and businesses of under-
served urban and rural America."
116
At this crucial application juncture, the CRA can be even more
powerful than Justice Department enforcement of the Fair Housing
Act or ECOA. The potential relative impact of these three Acts is
demonstrated by the 1993 Shawmut Mortgage case.
Data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act made available in
1991 revealed that "black and Hispanic applicants were being rejected
109. Id §§ 2902(1)(3)(A)-(D).
110. Id § 2902(E).
111. See Thelan, supra note 23, at 1. However, according to the Federal Reserve Board,
community activists challenge only about 10% of the nearly 3000 merger and acquisition
applications received annually. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. ChaseiChemical Vow Billions for CRA, Mortgage Marketplace, Nov. 6, 1995 at 12.
115. The Federal Reserve Board approved acquisitions for two New York bank holding
companies in July 1995, despite extensive protests by Inner City PresslCommunity on tha
Move, a Bronx community activist group. R. Christian Bruce, Fed Clears Chase, U.S. Trust
Dea4 Rejects Challenge from Bronx Group, Banking Rep. (BNA), at 1&2 (July 31, 1995).
116. NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION PROJECT OF THE CrEu-m YoP COMUN.imT-;
CHANGE, FACr SHEET ON THE Co. suNwrry REINVmEsr1iENT Acr (CRA) A-.D EFOP.TS Im
CONGRESS TO GUT THE LAW 1 (n.d.).
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by Shawmut and other banks across the country at twice the rate of
whites." '117 An investigation and complaint filed by the Department
of Justice resulted in the creation of a $960,000 compensation fund for
minorities against whom Shawmut had discriminated, and the continu-
ance of a fair lending compliance program.""
During the Justice Department's investigation, Shawmut applied
to the Federal Reserve Board for approval of the acquisition of New
Dartmouth Bank, a New Hampshire bank. The Board, which had
originally referred Shawmut to the Department of Justice after the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study,119 refused the application on a
split vote of three to three.120
Chairman Greenspan and Governors Mullins and Lindsey ex-
plained their vote against the application:
We believe ... that the Board cannot approve an application to
acquire a bank under the BHC Act without strong evidence that the
applicant in these circumstances has programs in place to ensure
compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and has a
demonstrated record that the programs are adequate and working
well.12
1
Although Shawmut had begun to implement measures to address
its discriminatory loan policies, the three Board members believed
that "these steps are relatively new, and, in our view, have not been in
place for a sufficient period of time to allow an adequate evaluation
either of the effectiveness or sufficiency of these initiatives."'
122
While the Justice Department consent decree cost Shawmut
$960,000, the denial of its acquisition application is reported to have
cost the bank "tens of millions of dollars.' 23 Although the Shawmut
application denial did not arise out of a CRA evaluation, the case
117. DEPr. OF JusTncE, As a Result of Corrective Actions, Justice Department Settles
with Shawmut for Alleged Discriminatory Practices, Dec. 13, 1993, at 2 (press release).
118. Id.
119. FED. RESERVE, Fed. Reserve Press Release (Nov. 19, 1993), in MURPH4Y ET AL.,
supra note 73, at 131, 132 ("In December, 1992, the Board made a referral to the Depart-
ment of Justice regarding the lending practices of Shawmut Mortgage Company, a subsidi-
ary of the applicant in this case, Shawmut National Corporation.").
120. Id. at 131.
121. Ld. at 132.
122. Id. at 133.
123. Bank Says Allegation of Bias in Lending Cost it Millions, MIAMI HERALD, May 14,
1994, at C1 ("Senior official of Shawmut National Corp. says that Federal Reserve's recent
sanctions against Shawmut because of concerns about its lending record to minorities cost
New England bank tens of millions of dollars.").
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demonstrates the vulnerability of a bank during the application phase,
and consequently, the potential impact of the CRAY 4
3. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 provides for no pri-
vate cause of action, nor does it claim to prohibit discrimination in
lending. Yet the HMDA is one of the most divisive pieces of legisla-
tion in the fair lending arena. 1 s
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act as adopted in 1975 originally
required banks, saving associations, and credit unions to publicly re-
port all mortgages originated, including the loan's dollar amount and
geographic location.126 The HMDA did not, however, originally re-
quire the lending institution to report an applicant's race or gender.
1 2 7
Therefore, studies such as the Color of Money could only report on
loans actually provided, and could only group these loans by
neighborhood.12
Congress amended the HMDA in 1989 vith the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).Z 9
These amendments required that the lending institution report "the
number and dollar amount of mortgage loans and completed applica-
124. Denial of the Shawmut application was actually due to an alleged ECOA %iolation.
However, the mechanism by which the Board refused the application is the same as would
arise in the CRA context. See FED. REsER\'E, supra note 119, at 129 (jSection 3 of the
BHC prohibits, except with the prior approval of the Board, any action that causes any
bank holding company to acquire more than 5 percent of the voting shares of any bank or
company to become a bank holding company."). See also Bank Holding Companies Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994) ("Banking and community factors. In every
case, the Board shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and
future prospects of the company or companies and the bank concerned, and the conven-
ience and needs of the community to be served.").
125. See supra text accompanying note 12. See also Seiberg, supra note 51, at 2 (-An-
other common complaint: the data used for the studies, gathered under the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act, are (sic) unreliable.").
126. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, P.L. 94-200, Title III, 89 Stat. 1125 (1975) (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (1983 & Supp. X1l 1994)). Note that bank mort-
gage subsidiaries and independent mortgage companies were not required to report under
the original Act, an omission which affected the usefulness of the Color of Money study.
See King, supra note 29.
127. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, P.L. 94-200, Title III, S9 Stat. 1125 (1975) (coJi-
fled as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (1983 & Supp. VI 1994)).
128. King, supra note 29, at 03. ("The 198S [Color of Money] articles, for ew'ample,
could only measure apparent racial discrimination indirectly-by looking at loan activity in
predominantly black or white neighborhoods. Lenders weren't required to disclos-e the
race of those actually getting loans.").
129. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 19S9, P.L. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(B)(b)(4) (Supp. VI 1994)).
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tions involving mortgagors or mortgage applicants grouped together
according to census tract, income level, racial characteristics, and gen-
der.1130 This new information provides a powerful tool for statistical
analysis.
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was also amended in 1991 to
require reporting of "loan application register (LAR) data."' 131 This
permits analysis of the number of applicants an institution is attracting
in a given neighborhood, and scrutiny of applicant characteristics on a
loan-by-loan basis.
Federal enforcement agencies regularly rely upon HMDA data to
identify problem lenders, or assist in investigations. HUD investiga-
tors use the data to:
[N]arrow and focus complaint-driven inquiries. When HUD re-
ceives a complaint from an individual who believes he or she has
been denied a mortgage loan on account of his/her race, HMDA
data can be examined to determine if the lender routinely issues
loans to borrowers with the same lender's profile as the
individual.132
Department of Justice Housing and Civil Enforcement Section
Chief Paul Hancock describes HMDA data as "a starting point:"'133
It shows how many minorities applied, how many have been ac-
cepted, how [many] minorities have not been accepted .... When
we use that as a starting point, it might help us target an institution
that might be looked at, but then what we have to do is go to the
files of the applicants to see if they are in fact treating people
fairly.134
While critics of fair lending have complained of the reporting bur-
den imposed by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and challenged
the accuracy of HMDA data, 35 it is the use of the data alone to prove
130. Id.
131. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, P.L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672
(1992) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 2802(B)j)(1) (Supp. VI 1994)).
132. Letter from Henry G. Cisneros, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, to the Honorable Henry B. Gonzalez, Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (June 12,
1995).
133. Hancock interview, supra note 94, at 2.
134. Id. at 2, 3.
135. See Sieberg, supra note 51 ("The main flaw with these studies ... is heavy reliance
on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data-statistics that researchers have been questioning
for years. Critics say the information is at best imprecise on such matters as credit
problems and relative wealth.").
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disparate impact or disparate treatment that has been of particular
concern.136 For example, HMDA data has been held to constitute suf-
ficient proof to warrant class certification in a suit alleging FHA and
ECOA violations.137 Critics of such use argue that HMDA data does
not address "whether rejected applicants were qualified to receive
loans."
138
The evolution of the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act, the Community Reinvestment Act, and the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act during the last twenty years has paralleled and
been fueled by a dramatic increase in the awareness of lending dis-
crimination in the United States. However, more aggressive prosecu-
tion of lending discriminators has prompted voracious criticism of fair
lending laws, and reform from the 104th Congress is likely. Before it
weakens or repeals American fair lending laws, however, Congress
should examine the British experience with lending discrimination
and enforcement.
HI. Fair Lending in the United Kingdom
Analysis of the British fair lending experience quickly reveals its
most significant contrast to the American model: there is no analogue
to HMDA data in the United Kingdom. 131 This lack of data compli-
cates an accurate assessment of the problem of lending discrimination
in Britain.
In addition to its use as an analytical tool, HMDA data also fo-
cuses attention on lending discrimination and generates political pres-
sure to correct the problem. In the United States, media and political
awareness of lending discrimination followed analysis of HMDA data
136. See, e.g., McCollum Amendment, supra note 65, at 2 ("(1) Disparate Impact Cases.
-No provision of this title shall be construed as allowing statistical data which tends to
show that the credit decisions of a creditor have had a disparate impact on %arious classes
of credit applicants to be used as evidence, in any action under this section, that the credi-
tor engaged in a pattern or practice in violation of this title ithout additional evidence
that-(1) the pattern or practice actually discriminated against any p2rson or class on a
prohibited basis; and (2) the creditor engaged in such pattern or practice with the purpose
or intent to engage in an activity in violation of this title.")
137. Buycks-Robertson v. Citibank Fed. Savings Bank, No. 94-C4094. 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9342, at *8-*10 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1995).
138. Judge Rules Against Citicorp Unit in Class Action Suit on Bias Claims, Banking
Rep. (BNA) at 162 (July 24, 1995).
139. Deborah Phillips & Valerie A. Karn, Race and Housing in a Property Ow'ning
Democracy, 18 NEw ComruNr 355 (1992) ('[R]ecords about the ethnic origins of buy-
ers and borrowers are not available and so the only source of information has b-.en ei-
dence produced by the Commission for Racial Equality [and similar studies] ... .").
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in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Fair lending laws were amended
and bolstered to address these concerns. 140 With no equivalent statis-
tical database demonstrating lending discrimination, British fair lend-
ing law has evolved without the political pressures influencing the
American system.
Despite the unavailability of national loan disclosure data, re-
gional studies have shown that lending discrimination is a pervasive
problem in the United Kingdom. This section will discuss the scope of
this problem, British legislation addressing lending discrimination, and
the limited enforcement methods available to enforce fair lending
laws in the United Kingdom.
A. Lending Discrimination in the United Kingdom
One important distinction between the United States and the
United Kingdom is the size of their respective minority populations.
Minorities make up 21% of the United States population, but only 4%
of the British population.
1 4 1
Urban racial segregation in the two countries varied greatly in the
early 1970's, with data showing the most segregated British group,
"Asians in Birmingham, were only as segregated as the least segre-
gated group of non-whites in the United States (non-whites in western
cities)."' 42
Twenty years later, racial segregation in Britain has become more
pronounced. The 1991 British Census showed that black groups made
up 13.5% of the population of Inner London, but only .1% of the
population of Northern England.143 Similarly, Indian, Pakistani, and
140. See, e.g., Rep. Conyers statement, supra note 11. Representative Conyers empha-
sized the need for FIRREA to include anti-redlining provisions. Rep. Conyers statement,
supra note 11 at H2578. Prompting his concern was his "survey of the recent literature on
the issue of redlining. Studies in Atlanta, New York, Detroit and Chicago have dramati-
cally documented how these redlining practices are crippling the inner city black communi-
ties. The Atlanta study found that qualified black mortgage applicants were as much as five
times as likely as white applicants to be rejected for home mortgage loans by S&L's and
banks." Rep. Conyers statement, supra note 11 at H2578-79.
Fair lending measures included in FIRREA included public disclosure of lenders'
CRA ratings. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, P.L.
101-73, Title XH, § 1212(b), 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b) (Supp. VI
1994)).
141. Goering, supra note 19, at 458.
142. VALERIE A. KARN & HAROLD WOLMAN, COMPARING HOUSING SYSTEMS: Hous.
ING PERFORMANCE AND HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN 59 (1992).
143. McCrudden, supra note 17, at 409-10.
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Bangladeshi groups made up 9.7% of the West Midlands, but were
only .4% of the population of South-West England.",
A number of political, economic, and social theories have been
offered to explain the segregation of British minorities. 1 45 However,
racial discrimination is indisputably a factor influencing minority
housing in Britain."4 Independent surveys have suggested the con-
tours of discrimination in lending in Britain, but have failed to provide
evidence as conclusive as analyses of American HMDA data.
One of the most thorough studies of lending discrimination in
Britain focused on home ownership in inner-city areas in Birmingham
and Liverpool." 7 Asians and West Indians received less help from
loan agents and solicitors, and were required to meet all of the strin-
gent and formal loan requirements.14 s By contrast, white applicants
who did not meet these requirements still received loans, often with
the assistance of agents or solicitors. 49
The combination of more stringent requirements for minorities
and less professional guidance through the loan process resulted in
higher minority loan rejection rates.lsa In Birmingham, 39% of white
loan applications were refused, while 42% of Pakistani, 53% of In-
dian, and 51% of West Indian applications were denied.'51
The Birmingham study also suggested that lending institutions
were engaged in racial "redlining," where an institution refused to
work within minority neighborhoods. The survey found dispropor-
tionately high denial rates in the early stages of loan applications in
inner Birmingham and Anfield.' Interviews revealed that, "over a
144. Id.
145. See, eg., Karn & Wolman, supra note 142, at 59-60 (theorizing that the allozation
of council housing, racial harassment, refuge from a hostile emronment, and the creation
of sizable markets for specialized goods and facilities help to explain racial segregation in
Britain).
146. Id. at 223.
147. VALEmRE A. KARN Er Ai-, Hoxm OwNE sHIP IN THE LNNER CrrY' SA.VATzON O1
DEsPAnR? 13 (1985).
148. Id. at 73-74.
149. Id. at 74.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 75, table 5.6. Interestingly, East African Asians were rejected at a rate of
33%, lower than the 39% white rejection rate. The author speculates the relatively high
income levels of East African Asians explains this difference. Id at 75 ("It could be ar-
gued that what we are seeing here is the effect of incomes rather than anything to do with
race. This could certainly explain the high success rates of the West Indians and East Afri-
can Asians, two groups with relatively good income levels.").
152. Id. at 6S.
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quarter of the buyers who were refused a building society 53 mortgage
in the initial inquiry stage in inner Birmingham and Anfield said the
reason given was that the society did not lend in that area, or that they
were buying the wrong type or age of property."1"4
Earlier studies were consistent with the findings of the Birming-
ham survey. In a 1967 survey, West Indian investigators were discrim-
inated against in 64% of their contacts with estate-agents.'-'
Availability of mortgages was the issue in one-third of these discrimi-
natory episodes. 6 In a similar 1973 study of estate agents, 29% of
West Indian or Asian testers received either less help or different
treatment than their white counterparts.1 57
Studies in Bedford suggested that building society managers
ranked minority loan applicants, favoring Italians and Asians but
characterizing Afro-Caribbean people as "unreliable and disor-
ganised, as having a cavalier or irresponsible attitude to finance...
they are judged to have failed to display the thrift and resourcefulness
so highly valued by the building society movement. 15s
Gender discrimination has also been detected in mortgage lend-
ing. A 1989 study found that in 4% of finance-related complaints, wo-
men felt the cause of the incident to be their sex.15 9 An earlier Equal
Opportunities Commission (EOC) study used testers to investigate
gender discrimination. 60 The EOC found that more than one third of
the institutions tested discriminated against women, refusing to fully
153. "Building societies [are] roughly equivalent to American Savings and Loan institu-
tions." DAVID H. McKAY, HOUSING AND RACE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: CIVIL RIGHTS
AND URBAN POLICY IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 89 (1977). Building societies
are the "major lenders for house purchase in Britain." FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE, BRITAIN'S BANKING & FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 16 (1993). In 1991 building soci-
eties lent £20,567 million for home purchases, while retail banks lent £4,807 million. Id. at
17.
154. KARN Er AL., supra note 147, at 70 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 77 (citing W. DANIEL, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ENGLAND 171 (1968)).
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing D. SMITH, THE FACTS OF RACIAL DISADVANTAGE 287 (1977)).
158. Norman Ginsburg, Racism and Housing: Concepts and Reality, in RACISM AND
ANTI-RACISM: INEQUALITIES, OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICIES 109, 119 (Peter Braham et al.
eds., 1991) (citing SARRE ET AL., ETHNIC MINORITY HOUSING: EXPLANATIONS AND POLI-
cIEs 289 (1989)).
159. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, A SOUND INVESTMENT?: THE TREATMENT
OF WOMEN BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 18, table 3.16 (1989).
160. Women and Mortgages; Shop Around, ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 1978, at 20.
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credit the women's income in the assessment of the couple's loan
qualifications.
161
Government studies conducted by the Committee for Racial
Equality (CRE) and published in 1985, found indirect discrimination
against Asian buyers by building societies which refused to lend on
certain types of homes. 62 The study of Rochdale concluded that "a
'blanket' policy or practice of lending only on properties which have
front gardens is indirectly discriminatory. Its applications in Rochdale
disproportionately affected Asians and was unjustifiable in the context
of Rochdale.'
'1 63
While these studies can be extrapolated to speculate on the ex-
tent of lending discrimination on a national scale, small local surveys
are inherently less compelling than American studies of thousands of
loan applications reported in HMDA data. One author's frustration
when discussing loan patterns and redlining is telling; "Once again the
problem of data arises. The truth is we do not know the precise na-
ture of building society lending policies." 64
Just as the availability of hard data suggesting widespread lending
discrimination shaped the development of American fair lending law,
the lack of such data in the United Kingdom has contributed to the
creation of relatively ineffective British fair lending legislation.
B. Fair Lending Law in the United Kingdom
The British loan agent faces a much less formidable array of fair
lending law than does his American counterpart. This section will dis-
cuss three fields of fair lending that correspond to American legisla-
tion targeted for reform: central government prosecution of patterns
of discrimination, enforcement by other regulatory agencies, and data
collection mechanisms.
161. 1d. One reason given for this refusal was that women become pregnant and will
leave work. Consequently, some institutions would give full credit to the w~ife's income if
she had had a hysterectomy or was over 40. ld.
162. COMMISSION FOR RAciAL EQUALITY, RACE AND MORTGAGE LENDING: REFOPT
OF A FomiAL INVESTIGATION 32 (19S5).
163. Id. at 35.
164. McKAY, supra note 153, at 90. See also Phillips & Kam, supra note 139, at 355
("[I]nformation about home-ownership amongst ethnic minorities and the operations of
the institutions involved in lending and selling is much harder and more expenrive to ob-
tain than is information about, say, council or housing association allocations.").
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1. Central government enforcement: The Commission for
Racial Equality and the Race Relations Act
Modem British antidiscrimination law centers around the Race
Relations Act of 1976 (RRA).165 As with the 1965 and 1968 Race
Relations Acts,'66 the 1976 Race Relations Act was heavily influenced
by the American experience in antidiscrimination law.
167
One such American influence was a broadening of the definition
of "discrimination" in the 1976 Act as compared to the 1965 and 1968
Acts. 6 ' In addition to "direct" discrimination, the 1976 Race Rela-
tions Act prohibits "indirect" discrimination: the "use of criteria
which have the effect of excluding disproportionate numbers of mi-
nority groups, irrespective of intention.'
'1 69
Discrimination on "racial grounds" includes "colour, race, nation-
ality or ethnic or national origins.' 170 The Act prohibits such discrimi-
nation in the "provision of goods, facilities, or services," 171 which
include "facilities by way of banking or insurance or for grants, loans,
credit or finance."'172
Gender is also protected under British fair lending law. The Race
Relations Act of 1976 followed and was modeled after the Sex Dis-
crimination Act of 1975.'73 The Sex Discrimination Act prohibits dis-
crimination against women in their use of "facilities by way of banking
or insurance or for grants, loans, credit or finance."' 74
165. McCrudden, supra note 17, at 418.
166. See Engels, supra note 17. See also McCrudden, supra note 17.
167. McCrudden, supra note 17, at 427.
168. Id.
169. McCrudden, supra note 17, at 418. See also, Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74,
§ 1(1)(b)(i)-(iii) (Eng.) ("(1) A person discriminates against another in any circumstances
relevant for the purposes for any provision of this Act if... (b) he applies to that other a
requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to persons not of the
same racial group as that other but-(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of the
same racial group as that other who can comply with it is considerably smaller that the
proportion of persons not of that racial group who can comply with it; and (ii) which he
cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the colour, race, nationality or ethnic or na-
tional origins of the person to whom it is applied; and (iii) which is to the detriment of that
other because he cannot comply with it.").
In this respect, the Race Relations Act is more comprehensive than the American Fair
Housing or Equal Credit Opportunity Acts. Neither of these two Acts prohibit indirect
discrimination ("disparate impact" or "disparate treatment") in their statutory language,
though a number of cases have found such a prohibition.
170. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 3(1) (Eng.).
171. Id. § 20.
172. Id § 20(2)(c).
173. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 75 (Eng.).
174. Ma. § 29(2)(c).
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The 1976 Race Relations Act created the "Commission for Racial
Equality" (CRE), a body appointed by the Secretary of State.175 Du-
ties of the Commission include to "work towards the elimination of
discrimination"'17 6 and to "promote equality of opportunity, and good
relations, between persons of different racial groups generally 1 77
The Commission's powers to fulfill these duties include the au-
thority to issue Codes of Practice for Equal Opportunity in Hous-
ing,17 8 to investigate allegations of discrimination, 17" to issue
nondiscrimination notices, 1 0 and in limited cases, to seek
injunctions.lSl
As in the Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity Acts, private par-
ties may also initiate litigation under the Race Relations ActY - How-
175. Id. § 43(1)(a).
176. Id.
177. Id. § 43(1)(b).
178. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 47(1)(c)-(d) (Eng.) as amended by the Housing
Act, 1988, § 137 (Eng.) (granting power to Commission to issue Codes of Practice in rental
housing), also amended by the Local Government and Housing Act, 19S9, ch. 42, § 19
(expanding power to issue codes to all forms of housing).
179. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 48(1) (Eng.) ("[T]he Commission may if they
think fit, and shall if required by the Secretary of State, conduct a formal investigation for
any purpose connected with the carrying out of those duties.").
180. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 58(2) (Eng.).
181. Id. § 62(1)(c) (Eng.) (allowing for the Commission to apply to a designated county
court for an injunction in the case of persistent discrimination).
182. Parties suffering discrimination in employment appear before industrial tribuna3.
Id. § 54(1)(b). However, parties suffering discrimination in the provision of goozis or serv-
ices bring their claims to county courts. Id. § 57(2)(1). Despite studies suggesting the mag-
nitude of the problem, there is no reported appellate decision of a case alleging racial
discrimination in lending. One reported case involved a plaintiff %%ho alleged that she "had
applied for housing loans under a staff scheme and had been unsuccessful, the lack of her
success being attributed to racial discrimination." Somersall v. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd.,
590 EAT 82 (1983) available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Engeas File. Ho.vever, the case
arose in the context of alleged employment discrimination, and the lending discrimination
claims were dismissed by the industrial tribunal. Id.
The author's search of Year Books from 1976 to the present also failed to disclos2 any
county court cases alleging racial discrimination in lending. Gender discrimination %Nas
alleged in one reported appellate case, though it involved the denial of a credit for hire-
purchase of furniture. Quinn v. Williams Furniture Ltd., ICR 328 (1981). Mrs. Quinn, a
married woman, was told she would need her husband to act as guarantor of a hire-
purchase agreement. Her husband, however, could have filled in the agreement without
her participation. Id. Mrs. Quinn had an independent income, and offered to show the
clerk her bank deposit book. Id. The company later affirmed that it would not have "im-
posed a guarantor requirement on a married man whose circumstances were, in all mate-
rial respects, similar to [Ms. Quinn's]." Id. Ms. Quinn directed a written question to the
alleged discriminator in compliance with statutory requirements in the Sex Discrimination
Act. [Similar requirements are found in the Race Relations Act; see, e.g., Race Relations
Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 65(1)(a) (Eng.) (requiring the Secretary of State to prescrib- forms by
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ever, unlike the American complainant, the British private party
cannot bring a class action to prosecute "discriminatory practices.,'1 3
Discriminatory practices include the:
[A]pplication of a requirement or condition which results in an act
of discrimination... or which would be likely to result in an act of
discrimination if the persons to whom it applied included persons of
any particular racial group as regards which there has been no occa-
sion for applying it.184
The Commission for Racial Equality has the sole power to prose-
cute "discriminatory practice" cases.'85 Some of the statutory powers
of the Commission for Racial Equality may seem greater than those of
the Department of Justice under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit
Opportunity Acts. For example, the Commission has the power to
issue a "non-discrimination notice" after its investigation, 18 6 while the
Justice Department must seek a hearing in federal court to enforce the
FHA or ECOA.' s7
However, analysis of cases pursued by the Commission for Racial
Equality reveals a much less aggressive record of enforcement than
found with the Department of Justice, 88 despite the fact that the two
which a person who suffered discrimination may ask the respondent why he or she did any
relevant act, or any other relevant matter)]. The court held, "[b]y requiring-or even sug-
gesting or advising-that she should get her husband to sign the guarantee form in order to
facilitate the agreement being entered into, it seems to me that there was unlawful discrim-
ination against Mrs. Quinn." Quinn v. Williams Furniture Ltd., ICR 328 (1981). While
Mrs. Quinn prevailed in this case, there is a conspicuous absence of similar suits in the field
of home mortgage discrimination. Given compelling evidence of pervasive gender discrim-
ination among building societies, a single reported case involving a furniture lease-hire is a
questionable record of enforcement of fair lending.
183. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 28(1) (Eng.).
184. Id § 28(1).
185. Id. § 28(3).
186. Id. § 58(2).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
188. The general British approach to banking and banking regulation heavily influences
the enforcement of fair lending law in the United Kingdom. According to one commenta-
tor, this approach:
[C]an best be described as cooperation between government and industry ....
Her Majesty's Treasury assumes the role of supervisory agency over the industry,
but it exercises this control in a relatively restrained manner. There is a general
system of guidelines and reporting requirements but relatively few hard and fast
rules that the banks must follow. The system is codified, but the supervisory as-
pect is still effected largely by moral suasion. The policy behind this loose system
is the British belief that whenever possible, government should accommodate
rather than restrict different kinds of banking business.
Bill Shaw & John R. Rowlett, Reforming the U.S. Banking System: Lessons From Abroad,
19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 91, 108-09 (1993). In addition to a laissez-faire ap-
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agencies share many of the same views on what constitutes discrimina-
tion. The following Commission example, identified as "discrimina-
tion in service provision," 189 would also be investigated and
prosecuted by the Department of Justice:
An estate agent's normal practice is to offer prospective purchasers
of properties facilities for obtaining mortgages. The estate agent of-
fers this service to prospective purchasers of properties in what are
considered to be white areas but not in areas where there is a large
black population.
190
Where the two agencies differ is in the enforcement of fair lend-
ing law in the event of such discrimination. The Commission's investi-
gation into race and mortgage lending practices in Rochdale provides
one of the most comprehensive illustrations of British enforcement of
fair lending law.1 91
The Commission's investigation focused on home purchase loans
in Rochdale from 1977 to 1981.192 The investigation revealed that
"Asians were less likely (50%) to have [building] society mortgages
than were Whites (75%) and were more likely to have resorted to
banks and the local authority."193 The significance of this difference
to the Asian borrower is clear when respective interest rates for the
period are compared; banks averaged between 16% to 20%, while
building societies charged 8% to 15%.194
proach towards banking regulation, recent British administrations have been at best am-
bivalent towards antidiscrimination legislation. "Stability," writes one author, "rather than
change has ... been the dominant policy. There has been little tampe.ring with the CRE
[Commission for Racial Equality]; nor have controversial decisions by the courts been
overturned by the legislature .... [Tihe Government's policy on race discrmination legis-
lation has, perhaps, been largely one of 'benign neglect."' McCrudden, supra note 17, at
439.
189. CONMUsSION FOR RACiAL EoUALrry, A GUIDE FOR Es-rArE AGEUM AND VEN'-
DORS 10 (1989).
190. Id. at 11.
191. CONMSSION FOR RACIAL EQuALrry, supra note 162, at vii. The Rc.Chdi1e study
is, in fact, the only Commission action to date taken against discrimination in lending.
(Though, as will be discussed infra, investigations and discipline of estate agents may have
fair lending repercussions.)
192. Id. The town of Rochdale is north-east of Manchester and is a former textile
center now in decline. Id. at 3. In 1981, 5.2% of the households in the Borough of Rceh-
dale were headed by a person born in the New Commonwealth or in Pakistan. Ict. "5S
of the Asian community lived in the five wards comprising the inner area of Rothdale."
Id.
193. Id. at 12.
194. Id. at 29.
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The Commission identified discriminatory practices of the Roch-
dale building societies that had created this disparity among Asian
borrowers. These included requirements that: "A property must have
a front garden in order to be mortgageable, or must be above a speci-
fied minimum purchase price or must not be located in a particular
area." 9
5
The societies openly discussed neighborhood minority composi-
tion as a factor in their mortgage decisions, as demonstrated by this
1977 guidance circular distributed to a society's local branches:
An assessment of acceptability of a property for mortgage is some-
times made more difficult by the presence of coloured occupants or
neighbors, but this in itself should not be a reason for refusing
properties if values generally are holding up.
196
While the Department of Justice targeted similar loan criterion in
the Chevy Chase case,197 important differences remain. The key dis-
tinction between CRE enforcement of the Race Relations Act and
Department of Justice enforcement of the FHA and ECOA lies in the
nature and extent of the remedies sought at the conclusion of an
investigation.
At the close of its Rochdale investigation, the Commission for
Racial Equality made a series of "recommendations for changes in
policies and practice of allocation of mortgages."'19 The recommen-
dations suggest that the building societies draft an equal opportunities
policy, designate a compliance officer, educate staff on discrimination
law, and provide information to loan applicants on loan criteria.1 99
Though less extensive, these recommendations are not unlike compo-
nents of the relief secured by the Department of Justice in the Chevy
Chase consent decree.2°
195. Id. at 32.
196. Id. at 23.
197. See, eg., Complaint of the United States, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Say.
Bank and B.F. Saul Mortgage Co., No. 94-1824-JG at 5 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994) (alleging
the bank intentionally avoided servicing of identifiably African American areas).
198. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALrrY, supra note 162, at 42.
199. Id. at 42-44. Other recommendations included the voluntary monitoring of the
ethnicity of loan applicants, and six month reviews of mortgage activity. Id. These meas-
ures will be discussed in section III.B.3, infra.
200. United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank and B.F. Saul Mortgage Co., No. 94-
1824-JG at 5-26 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994) (consent decree).
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However, the Chevy Chase consent decree secured injunctive re-
lief.2 ' By contrast, the Commission for Racial Equality "hoped that
[the recommendations would be adopted] ... by those agencies which
were the subject of our investigation. 202 The qualified response of
the building societies to the CRE's recommendations was telling; as
the Commission noted, "there was some interest in obtaining this in-
formation... initially on an experimental basis.
'" 0 3
Moreover, the Chevy Chase injunctive relief was much more ex-
tensive than recommendations made in Rochdale. In Chevy Chase,
the bank was required to revise its service area, 4 open additional
branches in African-American neighborhoods105 and direct special
advertising efforts to African-Americans. 236 Finally, the Chevy Chase
case also secured extensive monetary relief, requiring the bank to in-
vest eleven million dollars in "neighborhoods the United States con-
tends were redlined."2 °7
The Commission for Racial Equality has taken a somewhat more
firm stance against discriminatory estate agencies. In 1988 the Com-
mission investigated and issued a "non-discrimination notice" against
an Oldham estate agency which steered clients to different neighbor-
hoods according to their race, discouraged prospective Asian custom-
ers, and allowed only white customers access to mortgage facilitiesA3's
Such a notice:
[R]equires the organisation not to contravene specified provisions
of the Act, to take specific steps to eliminate such discrimination,
and, for a period of up to five years, provide the Commission with
201. Id at 15 ("Defendant Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank and defendant B.F. Saul
Mortgage Company, and all officials, employees, agents and successors of the Bank and
Mortgage Company are hereby enjoinedfrom engaging in any act or practice that discrimi-
nates on the basis of race in any aspect of residential real estate-related transactions or in
the extension of other types of credit.") (emphasis added).
202. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUAL Y, supra note 162, at 42 (emphasis added).
203. Id at 45 (emphasis added).
204. United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank and B.F. Saul Mortgage Co., No. 94-
1824-JG at 16 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994) (consent decree).
205. Id at 17.
206. Id. at 20.
207. Id. at 27.
208. Ginsburg, supra note 158, at 119 (citing COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALarIY, RA.
CLAL DIsCRIMINATION IN AN OLDHAri EsTATE AGENCY 5 (1990)). The Commission also
informally challenged two other Oldham estate agents engaged in discriminatory practices,
and concluded that "discrimination by estate agents may not be uncommon." Id. The
Oldham firm was the third estate firm to receive an antidiscrimination notice since the
Commission for Racial Equality was created. Id
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such information as is necessary to show that the notice is being
complied with.209
Even this most stringent measure is little more than the injunctive re-
lief routinely secured by the Department of Justice. Significantly, no
non-discrimination notice has ever been issued by the CRE to a lend-
ing institution.
The Commission for Racial Equality's record of fair lending en-
forcement under the Race Relations Act pales in comparison to that
of the Department of Justice under the FHA and ECOA. Similarly,
British banking regulatory agencies have less power to ensure fair
lending practices than is enjoyed by their American counterparts
under the Community Reinvestment Act.
2. British Regulatory Agency Enforcement: The Estate Agents
Act and the Consumer Credit Act
There is no British equivalent to the Community Reinvestment
Act. Discriminatory estate agents can be prohibited from estate
agency work by the Director General of Fair Trading under the Estate
Agents Act of 1979.210 Those offering consumer credit (including
mortgage brokers) who discriminate can be denied a license by the
Director of the Office of Fair Trade under the Consumer Credit Act of
1974.211 However, the Consumer Credit Act makes no provision for
regular lending reviews, standardized rating systems, direct commu-
nity input to the Office of Fair Trade, or special scrutiny during
merger activity.
209. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, supra note 189, at 19.
210. The Estate Agents Act of 1979 allows the Director General of the Office of Fair
Trade to issue an order preventing a person "from doing any estate agency work at all,"
Estate Agents Act, 1979, ch. 38, § 3(2)(a) (Eng.), if the person has "committed discrimina.
tion in the course of estate agency work." Id. § 3(1)(b). The Commission for Racial
Equality is directed to furnish the Office of Fair Trade with information regarding any legal
actions taken against agents. Id. § 6(c). As shown by the Birmingham study, discrimina-
tory estate agents who refuse to assist applicants can have a dramatic impact on mortgage
success rates. See supra text accompanying note 150.
211. The Consumer Credit Act of 1974 instructs the Director of the Office of Fair Trade
to take into account whether the license applicant, "practised discrimination on grounds of
sex, colour, race or ethnic or national origins in, or in connection with, the carrying on of
any business." Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39, § 25(2)(c) (Eng.). Mortgage brokers
are among the groups falling under the term "consumer credit." Consumer Credit; Good,
but not Enough, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 1976, at 68. Upon passage of the Consumer Credit
Act, the Office of Fair Trade hired 90 agents to enforce the licensing system. Id.
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The Commission for Racial Equality has specifically requested
legislation which would replicate some of the regulatory agency pow-
ers found in the Community Reinvestment Act, recommending that:
[T]he proposed extension of the Chief Registrar of Friendly So-
cieties supervisory controls over building societies take into account
the issue of racial discrimination.
The Commission proposes that the new building societies legis-
lation gives the Chief Registrar the authority to take action where a
building society has been proved to have committed racial
discrimination.
A precedent for such a proposal is provided by the Estate
Agency Act 1979 which gives the Director General of Fair Trading
powers of prohibition if a person doing estate agency work has been
proved to have discriminated during the course of that work- 12
While new building societies legislation was eventually
adopted,21 3 this legislation did not give the Chairman of the Building
Societies Commission the fair lending authority sought by the CRE.
This regulatory gap is particularly significant because building socie-
ties make the vast majority of British home loans.214
The Commission for Racial Equality has also recommended the
monitoring of home mortgage loans similar to that required by the
Community Reinvestment Act.215 However, the lending industry has
yet to adopt these recommendations.
2 16
The monitoring recommendations of the Commission for Racial
Equality point out another difference between British and American
fair lending systems-the collection of data for home loan
applications.
212. CoAMMSSION FOR RACIAL EQUALTy, supra note 162, at 50.
213. Building Societies Act, 1986, ch. 53 (Eng.).
214. FOREIGN AND CoMMONWEALTH OFFIcE, supra note 153, at 17.
215. CONSUSSION FOR RACIAL EouALrry, supra note 162, at 44 ("Monitoring con-
ducted at six-monthly intervals should consist of an analysis of the ethnic origin of all
applicants and the outcome of applications in relation to a number of factors. Outoe
categories suggested are: offers accepted; refusals; withdrawn before offer, withdrawn af-
ter offer
We suggest the following factors be monitored:
(i) age of property;
(ii) type of property;...
(v) area of property-this factor to be defined at branch level by identifing ar-
eas of ethnic minority concentration").
Compare these recommendations to the CRA requirements described in the text accompa-
nying notes 100-03.
216. COMNMSSION FOR RACIAL EQuALrrY, supra note 162, at 45-46.
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3. National Collection of Home Mortgage Loan Data
Racial and ethnic data is monitored both by the British Civil Ser-
vice and the Ministry of Defense, and "race" was included as a ques-
tion in the 1991 Census.217 However, there is no requirement that
racial or ethnic data be collected on British home or business loans.
One English author has observed, "Black people opposed the collec-
tion of ethnic statistics because they feared their use in a repatriation
round-up. '218 The author noted, however, that "a high success rate in
anti-discrimination suits is only possible if such statistics are used.
' 2 19
The Commission for Racial Equality recommended loan report-
ing that closely resembled American HMDA requirements:
The building society and the local authority should make ar-
rangements to record the ethnic origin of all applicants for mort-
gages. It is important that all enquiries for a mortgage on a specific
property should be monitored. The investigation has shown that
building societies have a practice of refusing applications at the ini-
tial enquiry stage before a formal written application is made, which
means there is no written record of that application.
The only way in which an organisation can ensure that it is not
discriminating directly or indirectly is to monitor records of ethnic
origin. Monitoring is critically important in assessing the uninten-
tional effects of policies and practices which can be potentially indi-
rectly discriminatory.
220
However, these recommendations were not mandatory, and the
building societies have not voluntarily adopted self-monitoring of
loans.221
There are a number of social, political, and demographic reasons
which explain the different fair lending enforcement experiences of
the United Kingdom and the United States.'2 The most obvious rea-
son, however, is the relative weakness of British fair lending law. The
217. McCrudden, supra note 17, at 438-39.
218. Hansen, supra note 18, at 231.
219. Id.
220. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EOUALrry, supra note 162, at 43.
221. d at 45.
222. See Hansen, supra note 18, at 229. The class action, an important tool in American
Civil Rights litigation, has no equivalent in English law. Instead, the Commission for Ra-
cial Equality has the responsibility for prosecuting "practice" discrimination, often with
disappointing results. Id. In 1980, the United Kingdom staffed the Commission for Racial
Equality with 229 members, only 60 of whom were assigned to investigation and com-
plaints. Id. The United States federal government employed over 6000 for enforcement of
civil rights in the same year. Id. Another important distinction is the allocation of legal
costs in the two countries. Attorneys bringing antidiscrimination suits in the United States
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following section will demonstrate that the British experience of inef-
fective fair lending enforcement counsels against the current proposed
reform of American fair lending law.
IV. British Lessons for American Reform
While predictions on the form and structure varied wildly, there
was a broad consensus at the start of 104th Congress that American
fair lending law would undergo significant reform.? a As 1996 ap-
proached, the odds of such reform seemed less sure,- 4 though the is-
sue is still likely to be taken up again in the future.32 The 104th
Congress and its committees considered three dramatic fair lending
reform measures in its first session: (1) removing the "pattern and
practice" authority of the Attorney General to enforce the Fair Hous-
ing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts,226 (2) creation of "safe
may recover attorney's fees. Id. at 231. By contrast, in Britain it is "extremely difficult to
obtain an order for costs in the industrial tribunals where many cases are heard." Id.
223. See Banking; Regulatory Relief, Expanded Powers on Horizon for Banks, LaWare
Tells IBAA, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A32 (Feb. 16, 1995). Federal Reserve
Board Governor LaWare predicted, "The banking industry, burdened by over-regulation,
is about to enter a new era of regulatory relief, expanded powers, and financial integra-
tion." Id. See also Bankers Hopeful a GOP Congress Will Mean Expanded Powers, More
Relief, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at 10 (Jan. 17, 1995) ("[Bjankers say they see a
regulatory relief bill in sight this year. Congressional staff on both sides of the aisL nad in
agreement, though how much relief, and on what legislative vehicle, is anybody's guess.").
Republicans aggressively targeted fair lending law as the 104th Congress began in its work.
For example, in July of 1993 President Clinton asked the federal regulatory institutions to
issue new Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations. Financial Institutions: Banks
Can Expect CRA Rule in Spring After Congress Holds Hearings in March, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA), at A28 (Feb. 10, 1995). In response, the agencies promulgated new
rules and solicited public comment, but were asked by Republican Representative Marge
Roukema to delay adoption of the rules until after Congressional hearings in March. ld.
Rep. Roukema, Chairman of the House Banking Committee's Financial Institutions sub-
committee, wanted "to take a look at the claims of some that the CRA has become a form
of credit allocation." Roukema Eyeing Ovehaul of Community Investment Act, NAT'L
JOUmNA'S CONGRESS DAUY, Feb. 9, 1995. In addition to the Community Reinvestment
Act, the new Congress vowed to scrutinize the current enforcement of fair lending law.
Rep. Roukema's subcommittee planned to address "allegations that the Department of
Justice may be enforcing these laws differently than the primary bank and thrift regula-
tors." House Banking Committee Approves Oversight Plan for 104th Congress, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA), at A29 (Feb. 10, 1995).
224. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Banking Reform in Jeopardy, NAvo-'s Bus.,
Sept. 1995, at 31 (stating that without a compromise on the issue of whether banks could
sell insurance, both banking-reform bills "appear to be dead for the year").
225. Lisa Troshinsky, Senate Reg Relief Bill Kills CRA Reform to Avoid let,, Regula-
tory Compliance Watch, Oct. 2, 1995 at 1.
226. McCollum, supra note 65.
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harbors" during the CRA application procedure, 227 and (3) removing
HMDA reporting requirements from much of the lending industry.228
Each of these proposals would replicate aspects of the ineffective Brit-
ish fair lending model.
A. Removal of the Attorney General's "Pattern and Practice"
Authority
On June 14, 1995, a subcommittee of the House Banking Com-
mittee adopted an amendment sponsored by Representative McCol-
lum. 2 9 The goal of the amendment was to "eliminate the unnecessary
role of the Justice Department in Fair Lending cases. ' 23 0 This was
done by striking the "pattern and practice" clauses of the Equal
Credit Opportunity and Fair Housing Acts. 231 Consequently, the Jus-
tice Department would only be able to prosecute cases referred by
regulatory agencies, such as HUD or the Federal Reserve Board.
It is unlikely that the subcommittee realized the enormity of its
actions when it passed the amendment.232 Within a day Attorney
General Reno issued a strongly-worded press release condemning the
amendment:
Yesterday, a Congressional subcommittee adopted an amend-
ment that would cripple our nation's efforts to fight discrimination
in the sale, rental, and financing of housing.
227. H.R. 1362, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 650, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
228. 1d.
229. Amendment to H.R. 1362; CONG. Q. U.S. H.R. 1362 SUMMARY, 6114195 Subcom-
mittee Vote.
230. Committee on Banking and Financial Services, Amendment Form Cover Sheet; Bill
No. H.R. 1362 ("Explanation" section).
231. Amendment to H.R. 1362, §§ 124(a)(2), (b)(2).
232. Lobbyists present at the subcommittee meeting speculate off-the-record that Rep.
McCollum intended to address only fair lending cases, and did not realize his amendment
would prevent the Department of Justice from pursuing all "pattern and practice" cases,
fair lending or otherwise. Justice had also brought hundreds of very important "pattern
and practice" fair housing cases under the stricken clause-cases which have enjoyed bi-
partisan support. See DEPT. OF Jus'ncE, Attorney General Janet Reno Questions Congres-
sional Attempts to Prevent the Justice Department from Fighting Housing Discrimination,
June 15, 1995 (Press Release). The amendment was therefore (and perhaps inadvertently)
the most dramatic legislative blow to Civil Rights in many years. The amendment also
prohibited the use of statistics to prove "disparate impact" in a case brought under the Fair
Housing or Equal Credit Opportunity Acts. Amendment to H.R. 1362, § 124(a)(1), (b)(1).
Ironically, the Justice Department has never alleged "disparate impact" in a fair lending
case. See Hancock Interview, supra note 94, at 19 ("Our lending cases have not raised
disparate impact issues. They've all been cases of disparate treatment, intentional
discrimination.").
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For nearly three decades the Attorney General has had the au-
thority to bring cases challenging patterns of discrimination. Yester-
day's action threatens anti-discrimination measures that have
repeatedly received bipartisan support.
We have brought hundreds of cases protecting the rights of mi-
norities who have been denied housing or have been rejected for a
loan because of their race, gender or national origin. It is unthink-
able that the Justice Department would no longer be able to chal-
lenge patterns of discrimination .... [T]he Subcommittee ... turns
back the clock on Civil Rights? 3
Department of Justice Section Chief Paul Hancock described the
McCollum amendment as "a very serious change in the Civil Rights
Division... a very serious change in the law."' -  Opposition to the
amendment quickly mounted, with a Washington Post editorial
describing the measure as "a retreat on fair housing."'' 5 With contro-
versy over the McCollum amendment threatening the underlying reg-
ulatory reform bill, Republican Banking Committee Chairman Jim
Leach and other Republican committee members were forced to pass
a Democratic amendment which effectively restored the "pattern and
practice" language. 36
The immediate threat to Department of Justice enforcement of
fair lending cases has passed, but lending industry and Republican ani-
mosity to the enforcement remains. While some of the repercussions
of limiting "pattern and practice" cases are obvious,2 37 the British ex-
perience suggests other, more subtle effects.
The tone of a recent article in the English magazine The Econo-
mist is similar to that of American criticism of fair lending. The article
discusses a British government study showing gender discrimination in
one-third of building societies surveyed:
In America most bankers say that the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act has gone too far .... The British law is still basically sensible,
233. DEPT. op JusncE, supra note 232.
234. Hancock Interview, supra note 94, at 19.
235. A Retreat on Fair Housing, VAsH. PosT, June 22, 1995, at A30.
236. See id. (Attorney General Reno wrote to Chairman Leach expressing her con-
cerns). See also Amendment to H.R. 1362, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., Ist Sass., 3
(June 27, 1995) (Rep. Hinchey).
237. For example, four of the eight fair lending cases brought by the Department of
Justice to date have been "pattern and practice" cases. See supra text accompanying notes
76-77.
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and in a state where it can best be enforced by publicity and
competition.
When couples do realise what is happening, building societies that
discriminate will lose out. The small (5%) but growing proportion
of couples where wives earn more than husbands will shop around.
They will choose one of the two in five societies wholly innocent in
the eyes of the EOC.238
The remedies suggested are emblematic of the British approach
to fair lending, which does little to address the problem of lending
discrimination. In this example, relying on the free market assumes
that a boycott by a small cadre of loan applicants, (5% of couples),
will affect the discriminatory practices of an entire industry. Even this
small figure assumes perfect information of a lender's discriminatory
practices to all loan-seeking women, and assumes all women will par-
ticipate in a boycott. The freemarket approach applied in this exam-
ple would effectively result in a 60% reduction of the marketplace to
female applicants. Finally, the free market model also produces "red-
lining," where minorities effectively suffer a 100% decline of the mar-
ketplace and are entirely excluded from the loan industry.
Publicity and competition do not protect minorities against lend-
ing discrimination. Weak British fair lending law has been equally in-
effective. The Commission for Racial Equality has not aggressively
prosecuted lending discrimination, and private individuals have no au-
thority to pursue "discriminatory practice" cases.2 39
To limit the authority of the Department of Justice in prosecuting
fair lending complaints would be to emulate the ineffective British
Commission for Racial Equality. Concededly, unlike British com-
plainants, American private litigants can bring class actions under the
Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts.240 However, only
the Department of Justice has the resources and expertise to bring
"pattern and practice" discrimination suits, which require many years
and hundreds and thousands of dollars to prosecute.24'
238. Women and Mortgages, supra note 160 (emphasis added).
239. See supra text accompanying note 183.
240. See, eg., Buycks-Robertson v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, No. 94-C4094, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9342, at *8-*10 (N.D. I11. July 29, 1995).
241. See Robert G. Schwemm, Introduction to Mortgage Lending Discrimination Law,
28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1995) ("The bad news [about Decatur Federal is that
this case took a year and over $1 million for the Justice Department to investigate. And
even within that year, months and months went by before anyone in Justice was confident
that this would turn out to be a legitimate, provable case. Accordingly, if your focus is a
little more modest, and you are unwilling to spend one million and a full year investigating
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Banking regulatory agency referrals to the Department of Justice
would not compensate for the loss of pattern and practice authority.
In the words of one expert, "[t]he banking agencies have not com-
pletely 'signed-on' to the Justice Department's theories of discrimina-
tion advanced in... Chevy Chase."24 Consequently, "a restriction on
the Department's ability to bring suits independently of banking regu-
lators would be a significant limit.
24 3
Representative McCollum's attempt to limit the Justice Depart-
ment's enforcement of fair lending law would have had enormous
consequences, and represents a troubling symptom of industry hostil-
ity to fair lending enforcement. However, it is unlikely that Rep. Mc-
Collum could successfully reintroduce the amendment in the Banking
Committee or on the House floor now that the Attorney General has
raised the political stakes. More troubling-because it is more likely
to ultimately occur-is the proposed reform of the Community Rein-
vestment Act.
B. Safe Harbors During the CRA Application Process
House Resolution 1362, "A bill to reduce paperwork and addi-
tional regulatory burdens for depository institutions,"2 4 also reduces
lending industry fears of a merger application being denied due to
CRA compliance. As reported by the subcommittee, the bill would
permit:
[W]ell-capitalized and well-managed bank holding companies that
are rated 'satisfactory' or 'outstanding' for Community Reinvest-
ment Act performance to acquire another bank, without prior ap-
proval, when the acquisition is limited in size, meets competitive
criteria established by the Federal Reserve Board, and meets appli-
cable geographical and other established statutory requirements2 45
On first impression, these "safe harbors" seem to be innocuous
rewards for lending institutions which have done a good job of invest-
ing in their community. However, when CRA grade inflation is taken
your first case, you might approach Decatur Federal as a source of ideas rather than a
model for your own litigation.").
242. McCollum Floats New Changes Aimed at Combatting Redlintng, Wash. Insider
(BNA), (May 24, 1995) (observations of Richard Ritter, former special litigation caunZ-l
dealing with fair lending issues in the Department of Justice).
243. Id.
244. .K 1362, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
245. CONG. Q. U.S. H.R. 1362 SuMMARY, 6115195, Subcommittee Vote: Financial Instmu-
dons Regulatory Relief Act/Vote to Report, H.R. 1362, 104th Cong., 1st S ss., Title II
§§ 201-12.
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into account, it becomes clear that this reform exemption swallows the
statutory rule.
House Resolution 1362 exempts institutions receiving
"[s]atisfactory" or "[o]utstanding" evaluations from the application
process. In 1992, 90% of banks reviewed received these two highest
evaluations.246 In 1993, 93% of the banks reviewed received the high-
est two evaluations.247 "Outstanding" or "[s]atisfactory" evaluations
were given to a record 94% of banks in 1994.248 Because federal bank
and thrift regulators are so generous in their CRA ratings, the "safe
harbor" provision in H.R. 1362 would have subjected only 6% of
America's banks to community investment scrutiny during 1994 merg-
ers and acquisitions.
As a corollary to removing the application requirement for banks
receiving a "[s]atisfactory" or greater rating, H.R. 1362 also denies
citizens official input during acquisition or merger periods. Citizen-
group advocacy during this vulnerable CRA juncture has resulted in
considerable concessions from the industry in the form of community
loans and outreach.249 By contrast, British advocacy groups, with no
such access to national regulatory agencies, have been marginalized in
the fair lending process.
By making community lending records a factor in federal agency
application approval, the Community Reinvestment Act became one
of the most powerful forces driving fair lending compliance. Ironi-
cally, Britain's Commission for Racial Equality has recommended leg-
islation to establish regulatory controls similar to American measures
which now may be eliminated.25 °
The safe harbors proposed in H.R. 1362 have found their way
into various house measures, but have met with limited success thus
far. A House Republican attempt to include CRA reforms in a seven-
year budget bill was opposed by Chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee Alfonse D'Amato, and rejected in House-Senate negotia-
tions.251 House Banking Committee Chairman Leach was forced to
remove safe harbor provisions from his compromise regulatory relief
246. Shannon Henry, Record 94% of Ratings 'Outstanding' or 'Satisfactory' Am.
Banker (BNA), Jan. 26, 1995, at 10.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
250. See supra text accompanying note 220.
251. John Machacek, Negotiators Reject Bid to Weaken Law Encouraging Lending to
the Poor, Gannett News Service (Nov. 13, 1995).
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package, under the threat of a presidential veto.3 z Nonetheless, CRA
exemptions remain a live issue, with Senator D'Amato considering a
regulatory relief bill that would grant a safe harbor for institutions
with an "Outstanding" rating.253
The British experience counsels against the adoption of CRA
safe harbor provisions in future regulatory reform legislation. Com-
munity Reinvestment Act safe harbors would effectively destroy the
link between community investment and acquisition activity, and
thereby relegate the Act to the position of Britain's Consumer Credit
or Estate Agents Acts-noble legislative sentiments with no real bite.
C. Excluding Lenders from HMDA Reporting Requirements
Though it has moved more slowly, the Senate has also under-
taken reform of fair lending legislation. Senate Bill 650 amends the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act by upping the reporting require-
ment's scope from institutions having ten million dollars in assets, to
those having fifty million dollars in assets354 This is a significant re-
duction in the scope of coverage. Of the over eight thousand banks
that reported HMDA data in 1994, three thousand would no longer be
required to report under Senate Bill 650.2 5
The Department of Justice has criticized the relaxation of HMDA
reporting requirements, warning that the absence of HMDA data
would lead to more intrusive reviews of small banks.2 -' The execu-
tive's resistance to HMDA reform, however, has been less successful
than its lobbying against CRA revisions. While Congress has backed
away from CRA reform in the face of a threatened presidential
veto,257 Senate regulatory reform measures still contain the dramatic
HMDA exemptions.sS
252. Leach Readies Bill for House Floor Action, Banking Pol'y Rep,, at 13 (Nov. 6.
1995).
253. D'Amato Floats 'Trojan Horse' Relief Bill, The Regulatory Compliance Watch,
Nov. 20, 1995 at 2.
254. S. 650,104th Cong., 1st Sess. Title II § 236 (1995). See also H.R. 183S, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 116 (1995); H.R. 2250, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 409 (1995).
255. HUD, Statement Before the Senate Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institu-
tions and Regulatory Relief, May 3, 1995.
256. Jaret Seiberg, HMDA Data Exemption for Small Banks Would Mc,-n More Bias
Probes, U.S. Says, Am. Banker, at 3 (Nov. 10,1995) (reporting letter from Assistant Attor-
ney General of Legislative Affairs Andrew Fois to House Banking Committee Ciairman
Jim Leach).
257. See supra text accompanying note 252.
258. Bill McConnell, Senate Could Vote Next Week on Watered Down' Reg Relwf, Am.
Banker, at 2 (Dec. 1, 1995).
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Though HMDA reform has received less attention than proposed
CRA amendments, relaxation of HMDA reporting requirements
could be equally damaging to American fair lending enforcement.
Statistical loan data serves three functions in an effective fair lending
model: it focuses political and media attention on discriminatory
lending, it triggers a response by regulators or enforcement agencies,
and it helps narrow investigations of discriminatory loan practices.
Exclusion of over one-third of currently reporting lenders would frus-
trate these functions and lead to a less powerful enforcement system.
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data generated in Atlanta
well illustrates the three-fold function of statistics. Analysis of this
data by the Color of Money article prompted a political response and
contributed to the eventual toughening of fair lending legislation.2 5 9
The data and article also attracted the interest of the Department of
Justice, resulting in an investigation of Atlanta lending institutions and
the landmark Decatur Federal settlement.260 Finally, the Justice De-
partment relied on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data to help nar-
row its investigation of Decatur Federal,261 and to buttress allegations
of discrimination against the bank.262
Recognizing the power of loan data in identifying discrimination,
the Commission for Racial Equality asked five building societies in
Rochdale to "retain all unsuccessful applications" at the beginning of
its lending study.263 Only two of the societies fully complied with this
request, and one society provided no data at all.216 When the Com-
mission later recommended that all societies record the ethnic origin
of mortgage applicants, it met with a cool response from the
industry.265
Loan data is more than simply fodder for academic debate-such
data serves important structural functions in an effective system of fair
lending enforcement. The absence of loan data in the United King-
dom has insulated fair lending legislation from political pressure, de-
nied the Commission for Racial Equality an important "trigger" for
investigation and prosecution, and deprived fair lending advocates of
supportive evidence in fair lending claims. This lack of data has lim-
259. See supra text accompanying note 140.
260. DEPT. OF JuSTIcE, supra note 29.
261. See supra text accompanying note 134.
262. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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ited the effectiveness of the British fair lending model, a limitation
which counsels against removing or diluting American loan reporting
requirements.
V. Conclusion
The new HMDA data from 1994 demonstrates a remarkable
change in American lending patterns. Loans to blacks have increased
55%.266 Loans to Hispanics have increased 42%.267 These numbers
support a persuasive argument that the current, vigorous enforcement
of federal fair lending law has encouraged lenders to reach out to pre-
viously neglected minority markets.
This achievement is fitting, since the United States has tradition-
ally been a leader in the development of fair lending legislation and in
the aggressive prosecution of discriminatory lending practices. In par-
ticular, the American Civil Rights system has long served as a model
for British law and enforcement. As Congress considers American
fair lending law, the accomplishments reflected in the new HMDA
data and the shortcomings of the English system should caution
against dramatic reform.
In the last twenty years American fair lending law has taken an
enormous step forward in ensuring equal access to loans regardless of
gender, race, or national origin. The British experience teaches that
reform or repeal of this law would be two dramatic steps back.
266. Garsson, supra note 1, at 4.
267. Id.
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